Dworkin and legal positivists seek to provide guidelines for impartial Essay

Dworkin and legal positivists seek to reserve guidelines for impartial judicial decision making, but do so in incompatible ways and with different results. Discu - Essay Examplenon-Dworkian sense implies that the legal validity of a given norm, and hence whether it forms part of the impartiality of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits. This paper discusses the jurisprudential basis of impartiality in judicial decision-making based on the theory of Dworkin and juxtaposing the same with another contemporaneous legal positivist, Professor H.L.A stag.Dworkin, in his paper The Model of Rules, identifies and attributes to stag a four-fold doctrine2 (1) that law consists of rules (understood as legal standards that differ from what Dworkin calls principles) (2) that legal rules are place via a rule of recognition (3) that where a rule does not control a case, judges sire discretion and (4) that in those cases where judges have discretion, neither party has a pre-existing legal just to prevail. Dworkin rejects the merit of all these four doctrines, but for the purposes of the present essay we shall limit our discussion to the last dickens of these four doctrines identified by Dworkin. The purpose of this essay in so far as it attempts to set Dworkins theory with harts, shall be better served if prefaced by a brief survey of how Hart perceived the impact of judicial discretion on law-making. The variance in the two approach is scoop out illustrated by taking as an example the hard cases to be decided by a mash of law- that is, cases which have a unambiguously singular problem which has not be covered by the text edition of the relevant statute or which it is abundantly clear has never come within the contemplation of the legislature.Hart has consistently taken the view that, as a conceptual matter, what constitutes a question of law as hard is that the pre-existing law is substantively indeterminate with respect to that question and is insuff icient to determine a uniquely correct answer.3 Hard cases, therefore, arise because there is a gap or vacuum in the insurance coverage of pre-existing law. Since, in such